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Segregation  is  a  spatial  outcome  of  spatial  processes  that  therefore  needs  to  be  measured 
spatially. This is the axiom from which local indices of segregation are developed and applied to 
the local markets within which schools compete. The indices are used to measure patterns of 
social  segregation  between  London’s  state-funded  secondary  schools,  education  authorities, 
types of selecting and non-selecting schools, and, longitudinally, for cohorts of pupils entering 
the  schools  in  each  of  the  years  from  2003  to  2008.  The  paper  finds  sizeable  differences 
between apparently competing schools in the proportions of free school meal eligible pupils 
they  recruit,  with  selective  schools  especially  and  also  faith  schools  under-recruiting  such 
pupils. Whilst there is some evidence that differences between schools have decreased over the 
period, the trend is considered to be an artefact of using free school meals as a measure of 
disadvantage, a measure that the paper ultimately questions. 
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Reliable and meaningful measurement of residential segregation is 
essential to the study of the causes, patterns, and consequences of racial 
and socioeconomic segregation. Nonetheless, prior work on residential 
segregation has been limited by a reliance on methodological tools that 
do not fully capture the spatial distributions of race and poverty 
(Reardon & O’Sullivan 2004, p.122) 
It has been observed that segregation is a spatial outcome of spatial processes. 
Nevertheless, many indices of segregation are not spatial in that they construct averages 
over somewhat arbitrary residential or functional regions such as census tracts, 
electoral wards or local education authorities. The locations of the objects between 
which segregation is said to be occurring – for instance, schools or neighbourhoods – is 
of relevance only insofar as it places those objects within regions. Their relationships to 
each other at a sub-regional scale, their distances apart for example, are of no 
consequence. 
A focus on non-spatial indices of segregation has dominated the literature 
measuring the effects of school choice policies on patterns of school admissions in 
England and Wales. Although the merits and demerits of various indices have been 
thoroughly discussed (see, inter alia, Allen & Vignoles 2007; Goldstein & Noden 2004; 
Goldstein & Noden 2003; Gorard 2000; Gorard 2004; Gorard 2007; Gorard 2011; Gorard 
2009; Johnston & Jones 2010; Johnston & Jones 2011), the debate has not addressed the 
importance of measuring segregation spatially. This despite Gibson's & Asthana's (2000, 
p.139)  prescient observation that “in trying to establish whether or not the 
marketization of education has had a polarizing effect, the unit of analysis must […] be 
the local market within which schools (and parents faced with placement decisions) 
actually operate.” 
To that end, this paper develops a series of local and spatial indices of segregation to 
capture the competitive effects between schools. It begins with a summary of the types 
of segregation index commonly found in the literature on schools research before going-
on to introduce some spatial counterparts. Those local indices are then applied to a case 
study of London secondary schools looking first at pupils who entered the schools in the 
academic year 2008-9 and then at other cohorts from the year 2003 onwards. The 
indices are used to measure patterns of segregation between local education authorities (LEAs) within London, between different types of schools, and to examine whether 
levels of segregation have, on average, changed over the study period. 
The results of the study suggest apparently competing secondary schools receive 
differing proportions of FSM eligible pupils with especially selective schools but also 
some faith schools recruiting fewer of this group than other locally competing schools. 
Whilst there is some evidence that social segregation has decreased over the period this 
is likely to be an artefact of using free school meals as a measure of disadvantage. 
 
Measuring segregation 
The word segregation often is associated with the consequences of social rules, 
processes and institutions that impact differentially upon various economic, cultural or 
ethnic groups of people and which lead to geographical outcomes – the isolation or 
clustering of some groups within some places more than others. It is sometimes further 
associated with acts of avoidance;  of, for example, one group of people choosing to 
school their children separately from others. In both these uses, segregation is a 
pejorative term to describe a spatial patterning that is socially divisive and which social 
policy should seek to remedy. 
Though indices of segregation often have arisen from concern especially of racial 
divisions within the United States, some authors have sought to use the more neutral 
language of separation and to make the distinction between separations that are 
involuntary and those that are chosen, perhaps to better enable a person to express or 
develop their cultural identity, to provide comfort, familiarity and safety or as a 
response to the daily experience of frustration and disappointment with a system that 
has failed them (Harris 2011; Merry 2011). In any case, spatial patterns of separation 
can arise as minority groups within society exercise the same liberty of choice that the 
majority feel entitled to, albeit that there may be strong social pressures that frame 
those choices. 
Segregation indices are used to measure how various social or ethnic groups of 
people are distributed across a study region and whether there is evidence they are 
separated or not. In themselves, the indices are not restricted to any singular view of the 
processes that led to the separations or to whether those separations should necessarily 
be prevented. Their application tends to be cross-sectional not longitudinal,  a 
descriptive measure at any point of time rather than a process model of, for example, 
diffusion or concentration across the study region. Though not an exhaustive typology, the majority of indices fall into one of two types. The first measures and summarises the 
differences between each individual observation and some average or expected value 
for the study region. The second summarises the product of the observed and expected 
values. 
Equation 1 is a general expression of the first type of index: 
   
Index value = k pobs − pexp n ∑               [1] 
For example, when measuring social segregation between schools, where eligibility 
to receive a free school meal (FSM) is used to indicate a lower income household, pobs is 
the proportion of the FSM eligible pupils that are within the school, pexp is the contrast 
group, the summation is across all n schools within the local education authority (LEA) 
or some other zone, and k is a scaling constant, usually equal to 0.5. The definition of 
pEXP
The second type of index is similar, having the form: 
 can be, inter alia, the proportion of all pupils within the LEA that are FSM eligible, 
the proportion of pupils within the school that are not FSM eligible or the proportion of 
all pupils in the LEA that attend the school. These formulations produce a measure of 
within LEA variation, respectively an index of dissimilarity (Duncan & Duncan 1955; 
Duncan & Lieberson 1959) and the index used by Gorard (e.g. Gorard et al. 2003) (for a 
useful summary, see Johnston & Jones 2010). 
   
Index value = k pobspexp n ∑               [2] 
The index of isolation (Bell 1954; Shevky 1949) is one such measure, which, if used 
to measure social segregation between schools, would have as the observed value the 
proportion of all FSM eligible pupils within the LEA that are in each school and, for the 
expected value, the number of FSM pupils as a proportion of all pupils in the school. It 
can be interpreted as the joint probability of selecting a FSM eligible pupil at random 
from any one of the schools in the LEA, then selecting another FSM eligible pupil at 
random from all pupils who attend that school. Hence, whereas the first type of index is 
comparative, the second is probabilistic. 
Critically, the statistical properties of the index are affected by the definition of the 
observed and expected values, and whether they are differenced or multiplied (Allen & 
Vignoles 2007). There has been considerable debate about which indices best capture 
various theories and aspects of segregation but with no consensus. This is inevitable: 
segregation is a multi-faceted phenomena meaning different things to different people and arising as a result of any number of social process and/or individual choices. It 
seems unlikely that any measure of segregation could ever be definitive. 
 What is more certain is that segregation is a result of spatial processes that have 
spatial manifestations. Yet neither of the two types of index is spatial in the sense of 
producing a statistic that functionally is dependent on the location of the observations 
vis-à-vis the location of other observations within the study region. Any two schools 
could be proximate or entirely independent of each other within an LEA but that dis-
/connection is irrelevant to the measure of social segregation. 
 
Local indicators of segregation 
 
Local index of dissimilarity 
A local and spatial index of segregation is one where (a) each zone or place in the 
study region is considered with respect to all others with which it interacts, is proximate 
to, shares a border and/or with which there is an interdependency or connection; and 
(b) where a separate index value is calculated for every zone or place within the study 
region (as opposed to having one summary average for them all). 
The defining characteristic of the index is the use of a weights matrix to define the 
connections between places within the study region.  It is the weights matrix that 
permits the characteristics of one place to be compared with the (weighted) average for 
the places with which it is connected. Consider, for example, a local index of difference 
or of dissimilarity (LID) that compares some characteristic of a particular location with 
the characteristics of locations around it. Here, measuring social segregation between 
schools, the index will summarise the difference between the proportion of FSM eligible 
pupils in one school vis-à-vis the proportions in competing schools (defined below). 
That is, 
   
LIDi = pi − wijpj −1≤ LIDi ≤1, j ≠ i,0 ≤ wij j=1
n−1 ∑ ≤1, wij =1 ∑     [3] 
where pi
   
wijpj j=1
n−1 ∑  is the proportion of FSM eligible pupils within one school, and   is 
the weighted average proportion for the competing schools. The index will range from -
1 (no pupils within school i are FSM eligible, whereas all pupils in surrounding schools 
are), through 0 (the proportion of FSM eligible pupils in i is the same as the average for surrounding schools) to 1 (all pupils in i are FSM eligible; none in surrounding schools 
is). 
The weights matrix quantifies the strength of connection between the various 
places and entails a network view of geographical space, informed by the literature on 
local indicators of spatial association (LISAs) and on spatial econometrics (Anselin 1995; 
LeSage & Pace 2008). It can be determined in various ways, including by the inverse of 
the distance between schools which gives greatest weight to schools that are least far 
apart. Here, following Harris (2011), wij
This is some conceptual overlap with the measures of spatial segregation 
introduced by Reardon & O’Sullivan (2004)  (with parallels in Johnston et al. 2011). 
Using their notation and terminology, the index measures spatial evenness where, 
 defines the level of spatial competition between 
secondary schools, where competing secondary schools are defined as those recruiting 
pupils from one or more of the same primary schools as each other. Specifically, the 
weight is equal to the proportion of secondary school i’s intake that is drawn from the 
primary schools shared with school j, multiplied by the proportion of secondary school 
j’s intake that is drawn from the same. The weights are then scaled (row-standardised) 
so that the sum of the weights for any school is equal to one. 
    
LIDi = π pm − % π pm ,                [4] 
 
π pm is the proportion in group m at point p, 
  
% π pmis the proportion in group m in the local 
environment of point p (but here excluding p itself), and where the weights matrix is 
equivalent to the spatial function 
 
φ p,q ( ) defining the spatial proximity of locations p 
and q (but without the constraint 
 
φ p,q ( )= φ q,p ( ), i.e. that 
 
wij = wji ). 
However, Reardon’s and O’Sullivan’s purpose is somewhat different in that they are 
seeking to address the situation of forming segregation indices from individual data that 
must first be aggregated into some sort of spatially meaningful areal  ‘containers’ in 
order that differences in the prevalence of group m  across the region can be 
summarised. Here the point locations – the schools – already permit prevalence to be 
measured (they already represent aggregations of pupils and their characteristics at that 
location) and the aim is to assess how the differences between one place and those to 
which it is connected vary across the study region. Preserving the distribution of the LID 
values across the study region is as important as calculating a summary measure. 
 Local indices of isolation and of concentration 
A local index of isolation may be formed as the probability of selecting a person with 
a particular characteristic at one location and then selecting a second person without 
that characteristic from surrounding locations. It is a measure of spatial exposure under 
Reardon’s and O’Sullivan’s nomenclature and is calculated as: 
   
LIIi = pi wij 1− pj ( ) 0 ≤ LIIi ≤1, j ≠ i,0 ≤ wij j=1
n−1 ∑ ≤1, wij =1 ∑      [5] 
Applied to schools, this index will range from zero when there are no FSM eligible 
pupils in school i, to one when all the pupils in school i are FSM eligible but none of the 
pupils in the surrounding schools is. The index measures the prevalence of FSM eligible 
pupils in one school with respect to its competitors; of how concentrated FSM eligible 
pupils are within the one school.  
The index is not, however, composition invariant. As the proportion eligible for free 
school meals increases so, too, does the index. 
An example is given in Table 1. It imagines a simplified case where there are two 
schools in each of six observed LEAs and in each case school j is competing with school i. 
Working across the rows of the table, the LII scores for observations 1 to 3 act 
intuitively: as the proportion of FSM eligible pupils in school i decreases relative to those 
in school j, the index value decrease too. 
Imagine, however, that observations 4 to 6 represent a part of the study region 
subject to some exogenous shock, for example the closure of a local manufacturing plant. 
Alternatively, consider that observations 4 to 6 represent the same LEAs as 1 to 3 but at 
a different time period and during an economic recession. In either case, the context 
doubles the proportion of FSM eligible pupils within each LEA and within each school. 
The result is a rise in the index of isolation even when the proportion of FSM pupils 
remains equal for the two schools (compare observation 5 with observation 2). 
As Table 1 also shows, the local index of difference (LID) has some compositional 
invariance but only at the point of equality, when the one school has the same 
proportion of FSM eligible pupils as its competitor. In this case, the index will always be 
zero. A third index does, however, display full compositional invariance (in Table 1). 
This is the index of concentration (LIC), which allows for the differences between 
competing schools, the LID values, to be considered in respect to the local rate of FSM 
eligibility within those schools. Specifically, the local index of concentration is calculated 
as:       [6] 
 
For the rest of this paper, all three indices (LID, LII and LIC) will be used in tandem 
and on the basis that none is inherently superior to the others. In practice, they are 
strongly correlated, as Table 2 shows. 
 
  (1) pFSM    = 0.20  (2) pFSM    = 0.20  (3) pFSM = 0.20 
  FSM FSM i  !FSM j    j  FSM FSM i  !FSM j    j  FSM FSM i  !FSM j  j 
n  30  10  90    20  20  80    5  35  65 
N  100  100    100  100    100  100 
p  0.30  0.10  0.90    0.20  0.20  0.80    0.05  0.35  0.65 
LII 0.27 = 0.30 × 0.90   i    0.16        0.03     
LID 0.20 = 0.30 - 0.10  i    0.00      -0.30     
LIC 0.50 = 0.20 / (0.30 + 
0.10) 
i    0.00      -0.75   
 
  (4) pFSM    = 0.40  (5) pFSM    = 0.40  (6) pFSM = 0.40 
  FSM FSM i  !FSM j    j  FSM FSM i  !FSM j    j  FSM FSM i  !FSM j  j 
n  60  20  80    40  40  60    10  70  30 
N  100  100    100  100    100  100 
p  0.60  0.20  0.80    0.40  0.40  0.60    0.10  0.70  0.30 
LII  0.48        0.24        0.03     
LID  0.40        0.00      -0.60     
LIC  0.50        0.00      -0.75     
 
Table 1. Showing the calculation and value of the three local indices of segregation for a 
simplified case of two schools in each LEA (see text for detail). 
 
  LID  LII  LIC 
LID  1.000  0.766  0.812 
LII  0.766  1.000  0.764 
LIC  0.812  0.764  1.000 
 
Table 2. Pearson correlations, r, between the three local indices of segregation, 
calculated for pupils entering each of 366 secondary schools in London in 2008  
A case study of London secondary schools 
 
The Geography of social segregation between schools 
Figure 1 maps the local index of dissimilarity (LID) scores based on pupils entering 
each of 366 state-funded secondary schools in London in 2008 (hence the school year 
2008-9), where the information about those schools has been obtained from the pupils 
known to attend them, as recorded in the PLASC/NPD data 
(http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/plug/). It is a cartogram (Dorling 1996): the radius of 
each circle is proportional to the absolute score: the larger the difference in the 
proportions of FSM-eligible pupils of one school compared to its competitors, the larger 
the symbol. 
 
Figure 1. Showing the local index of dissimilarity (LID) scores for London secondary 
schools in 2008. The size of the circles is proportional to the absolute value. Note that it 
is not possible to read the values for specific schools from their location on the map (see 
text for detail). 
 To preserve the anonymity of schools the position of the symbols on the maps do 
not correspond directly to the true locations of schools. Some symbols have been moved 
slightly to prevent overlapping and a random selection of index values has been 
swapped with other nearby schools. Consequently, though the map preserves the broad 
geography of the schools and the spatial distribution of the index values, it is not 
possible to obtain the index scores for specific schools from their apparent location on 
the map. 
Across the region the index  ranges  from -0.295 (where  the school recruits 29.5 
percentage points less FSM eligible pupils that its average competitor) to 0.478 (it 
recruits 47.8 percentage points more). The interquartile range is -0.069 to 0.054. The 
mean is, of course, approximately zero  because the study region is a closed system 
where all pupils attend a school somewhere. Hence, those schools with low proportion 
of FSM eligible pupils balance those with high proportions. Because of this, a more usefil 
average is the mean of the absolute value, |LID|. This is 0.078. it shows that the average 
difference between a school and its average competitor is 7.8 percentage points in 
regard to the percentage of FSM eligible pupils they recruit. This is not inconsiderable 
given the percentage of pupils eligible for FSM that year was 26.8 per cent. 
Looking at Figure 1, there is evidence of a checkerboard effect, where some schools 
have a disproportionately high number of FSM-eligible pupils whereas surrounding 
schools have a disproportionately low number. The patterns are summarised by Table 3. 
This gives the mean of |LID|  for each LEA. The table also includes the  range and 
interquartile range of the LID values per LEA. Additionally, the LEA average proportion 
of FSM eligible pupils per school is included in the table, together with the standard 
deviation around that mean. Finally, LEAs where less than five schools are present in the 
data are excluded. Specifically, these are Harrow, and Kensington and Chelsea. 
Looking at the mean |LID| values, the LEA mean difference between a school and its 
average competitor ranges from 3.3 to 14.6 percentage points. However, that average 
conceals instances of much greater difference within LEAs. For example, one school in 
Barking and Dagenham has a percentage of FSM eligible pupils that is 47.8 points higher 
than its average competitor. This suggests that there are at least instances when the LEA 




    |LID|    LID    FSM 
LEA  n  mean    min.  Q1  Q3  max.    mean  sd 
Barking & 
Dagenham  8  0.146    -0.230  -0.156  0.002  0.478    0.321  0.199 
Hammersmith & 
Fulham  7  0.125    -0.240  -0.093  0.103  0.196    0.360  0.256 
Lambeth  11  0.123    -0.189  -0.098  0.053  0.385    0.357  0.194 
Hillingdon  16  0.110    -0.207  -0.108  0.073  0.287    0.216  0.146 
Barnet*  19  0.104    -0.161  -0.117  0.039  0.240    0.213  0.158 
Redbridge*  17  0.097    -0.175  -0.095  0.078  0.271    0.202  0.122 
Brent  13  0.096    -0.191  -0.079  0.019  0.219    0.292  0.139 
Camden  9  0.095    -0.118  -0.067  0.028  0.251    0.443  0.143 
Haringey  10  0.095    -0.171  -0.115  0.089  0.132    0.385  0.155 
Waltham Forest  15  0.092    -0.152  -0.084  0.076  0.218    0.332  0.127 
Hackney  6  0.087    -0.152  -0.078  0.084  0.112    0.452  0.122 
Newham  15  0.081    -0.147  -0.084  0.031  0.332    0.432  0.127 
Enfield*  17  0.077    -0.179  -0.085  0.007  0.245    0.269  0.155 
Greenwich  11  0.077    -0.145  -0.034  0.065  0.251    0.357  0.154 
Wandsworth  10  0.075    -0.161  -0.054  0.067  0.148    0.310  0.120 
Ealing  12  0.069    -0.139  -0.021  0.087  0.139    0.289  0.088 
Croydon  18  0.068    -0.120  -0.065  0.067  0.134    0.225  0.131 
Richmond upon 
Thames  8  0.068    -0.090  -0.069  0.066  0.114    0.185  0.083 
Bromley  17  0.067    -0.295  -0.023  0.039  0.233    0.129  0.100 
Havering  18  0.065    -0.186  -0.080  0.023  0.184    0.129  0.100 
Tower Hamlets  15  0.063    -0.132  -0.023  0.069  0.140    0.544  0.103 
Westminster  6  0.062    -0.114  -0.028  0.030  0.158    0.368  0.128 
Southwark  7  0.062    -0.139  -0.022  0.059  0.082    0.263  0.059 
Lewisham  10  0.060    -0.143  -0.045  0.038  0.114    0.309  0.103 
Sutton*  14  0.053    -0.126  -0.074  0.002  0.054    0.088  0.082 
Bexley*  13  0.052    -0.120  -0.065  0.013  0.098    0.082  0.070 
Hounslow  14  0.050    -0.095  -0.039  0.053  0.086    0.236  0.086 
Kingston upon 
Thames*  10  0.050    -0.126  -0.034  0.018  0.085    0.111  0.068 
Islington  8  0.038    -0.053  -0.016  0.051  0.086    0.485  0.057 
Merton  6  0.033    -0.041  -0.028  0.020  0.079    0.172  0.068 
*LEAs with academically selective schools 
Table 3. The mean, median, upper quartile and maximum |LID| values per LEA (London 
2008). 
 
The lack of social homogeneity across some LEAs more than others also is revealed 
by the standard deviation of the FSM variable that is greatest for Hammersmith and 
Fulham (0.256) and least for Islington (0.057). This, in turn, reveals why these two LEAs 
can have a very similar proportion of FSM eligible pupils on average and yet strongly 
differing mean |LID| values. The greater social heterogeneity in Hammersmith and 
Fulham is reflected in greater differences between schools as measured by the segregation index. Indeed, the Pearson correlation between the mean |LID| score and 
the standard deviation of the FSM variable per LEA is r = 0.878 (p < 0.001). 
The mean |LID| score also is related to the mean proportion of FSM pupils per LEA 
but that relationship is curvilinear  –  Figure 2. This is because the proportions are 
bounded by zero and one. Put simply, there is greater room for variation between 
schools at the centre of the distribution of FSM values than at the limits.  Nevertheless, 
the first five LEAs in Table 3 still display the greatest differences between schools even 
allowing for the rate of FSM eligibility. These are the LEAs that are furthest above the 
regression function in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Showing the relationship between the mean |LID| score per LEA and the mean 
proportion of FSM eligible pupils in its schools. The five LEAs shown with upward 
pointing triangles are the LEAs with greatest social segregation in Table 3. 
 
 
Social segregation by school type 
An enduring arena of debate is whether schools that select by academic attainment 
or by requiring practising faith amongst their admissions criteria act to propagate social 
exclusion, albeit unintentionally (Allen 2007; Sutton Trust 2008). 
Figure 3 groups the proportion of FSM eligible pupils per school and also the index 
scores by school type, showing their centre and range as boxplots. Selective schools, 
defined as academically selecting (they set an entry examination) admit a much lower proportion of FSM eligible pupils than other types of school: the median is less than p = 
0.028, approximately one tenth of the median for all other schools, p = 0.269, and the 
variation around the average is little. To some extent this is to be expected as FSM 
eligible pupils do not, on average, reach the same level of attainment as other pupils and 
so are less likely to take or to pass the entry examination for selective schools. Evidence 
of this is that the median attainment score for the standardised tests taken by all pupils 
in state-funded primary schools in their final year at the school was, for FSM-eligible 
pupils in London in 2008, 27 with an interquartile range from 25 to 29, lower than the 
median for ineligible pupils which was 29 with an IQR from 27 to 31. 
Faith schools, too, tend to have lower proportions of FSM eligible pupils, on average. 
Unlike selective schools, this cannot be a consequence of an entry examination because 
the category excludes the few faith schools that are also academically selective (those 
schools are within the selective group). It also cannot be due to location – the possibility 
the schools are located in areas of low eligibility –  because they under-recruit FSM 
eligible pupils when compared to their local competitors. Instead, it is more a 
consequence of who is able or willing to demonstrate some sort of commitment to or 
practice of the faith. It is notable that voluntary aided (VA) Church of England (CoE) and 
Roman Catholic (RC) schools –  ones that set their own admissions criteria and can 
include commitment to the religious group or denomination amongst them – under-
recruit FSM eligible pupils, on average and relative to their competitors, whereas 
voluntary controlled (VC) schools, which use the LEA admissions criteria, actually 
slightly over-recruit on average. Of course, we should be wary of generalisations and 
observe the variation around these averages. It is one of the mistakes in the debates 
about faith schools to treat them as a homogenous group when there are, for example, 
historical and intentional differences between schools whose first purpose is to serve a 
community of faith (and may recruit adherents form across large catchment areas) and 
those that have a history of serving their local community as a response to faith (schools 
that offered education to ‘the poor’ prior to the establishment of a national education 
system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
  
Figure 3. Boxplots showing the distribution by school type of proportions of pupils that 
are FSM eligible, the LID scores, the LII scores and the LIC scores. 
 
Longitudinal analysis 
The key question informing social debate about policies of greater school choice is 
‘do the policies lead to increased segregation?’ How they might is described by Weekes-
Bernard (2007, p.1) who outlines the problems of choice as follows: 
[F]irst, it assumes the ability (and willingness) of all parents to make 
these choices on an equally informed basis; and, second, it assumes 
that the field in which they make these choices is an open one. 
Research on working-class parents has demonstrated that school 
‘choice’ is more accurately allied to economic privilege, to the ability 
to work the system and to entrenched forms of middle-class social and cultural capital, while working-class and economically marginalized 
families are forced to make do with what’s left. 
However, an early and important longitudinal study suggested the opposite 
conclusion (Gorard et al. 2003). Focusing on secondary schools and using a measure of 
unevenness, its broad conclusion was segregation fell nationally and in most LEAs 
between 1989–95, with the overall percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals 
that would have to change school to create evenness dropping from about 35 to 30. It 
rose thereafter to 33 per cent in 2001 but not back to the level found in 1989. In other 
words, it appeared unlikely education policies were having the adverse impacts 
predicted. 
Unfortunately, interpretation of the empirical evidence is complicated by the 
measure of social disadvantage used, eligibility for free school meals (FSM). Eligibility is 
dependent upon personal circumstances that in some years will apply to more people 
than in others. It is not a consistent measure of pupils from the poorest fifth or so of 
households. One explanation that can be given for the fall of segregation that Gorard et 
al. find especially from 1991 is macroeconomics: the UK recession of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, creating ‘equality of poverty’ –  the idea that as the proportion of FSM 
eligible pupils rises the group becomes more evenly spread across schools. Allowing a 
lag period of one to two years, as the economy has improved so social segregation 
between schools has increased, falling again after 2007 as economic output fell sharply. 
This trend appears in Cheng and Gorard (2010)  though they are more circumspect 
about linking the changes in the segregation index to economic cycles. 
As it happens, the period of this study, 2003 to 2008/9, is one of economic growth, 
though the proportion of pupils in the PLASC/NPD data that are recorded as FSM 
eligible rises nevertheless, peaking in 2007 – Figure 4. 
Figure 5 reveals the trends in the local indices of segregation over the study period. 
It shows the mean |LID| (local index of dissimilarity), mean LII (local index of isolation), 
and the mean |LIC| (local index of concentration) scores as calculated for London 
secondary schools for each of the years. It is also includes the mean proportion of FSM 
eligible pupils in the schools each year. 
The is no evidence that the |LID| values have either increased or decreased over the 
time period, especially not once the 95 percent confident intervals around the means are 
considered. These can be calculated because we have an |LID| value for each school for each year permitting the variance of the values and thus the standard error of the mean 
to be estimated.  
 
Figure 4. Showing Gross Value Added per person in the UK and in the Greater 
London region at 2009 prices, and the proportion of secondary school pupils that are 
FSM-eligible (sources: Office for National Statistics and PLASC/NPD) 
 
On face value, the LII tells a different story, with the mean LII score rising each year, 
with a significant increase between 2003 and 2008. However, recall that the isolation 
index is not composition invariant. In fact, the correlation of the mean LII value and 
mean FSM eligibility is r = 0.999. 
Instead, looking at the |LIC| values, there is evidence that social segregation has 
decreased: between 2003 and 2008 the average difference in the proportion of FSM 
eligible pupils in one school vis-à-vis its competitors and relative to the (average) 
proportion of FSM eligible pupils in those schools has declined (a result that Leckie et al. 
(2010) also find using a multilevel modelling approach). 
Over the time period, it appears that the FSM eligible pupils have become less 
concentrated locally within particular schools. Further evidence to support the finding is 
found from a Lorenz curve, Figure 6. It shows that in 2003, 10 per cent of all FSM eligible 
pupils within the data set were found within just 2.4 per cent of all schools; 20 per cent 
of all such pupils were in 6 per cent of all schools; and 40 per cent were in 16.8 per cent 
of schools. By 2008 the corresponding figures were 10 per cent of FSM eligible pupils in 
3.3 per cent of schools (an increase of 37.5 per cent relative to 2003); 20 per cent of the pupils in 7.7 per cent of schools (an increase of 28 per cent); and 40 per cent in 18.6 per 
cent of schools (11 per cent). In short, FSM eligible pupils have become more spread out 
across London schools. 
 
Figure 5. Mean index values for pupils entering state-funded secondary schools in 
London in each of the years 2002-2008. 
 
 
Figure 6. Lorenz curve showing how concentrated FSM eligible pupils are within 
secondary schools in London and how that concentration has changed 
(decreased) from 2003 to 2008. See text for detail. There is, however, an important caveat. Between 2003-2008 the mean proportion of 
FSM eligible pupils in the London schools rises by 26.6 percent (from 0.214 to 0.271). 
The mean |LIC| score decreases by 19.6 percent (from 0.228 to 0.184). In other words, 
eligibility for FSM is rising faster than the index of segregation is decreasing. The 
suspicion must be that it is not so much that social segregation has decreased but that 
the group of pupils who met the criteria for FSM eligibility broadened (those criteria are 
listed at http://tinyurl.com/6jr65r4).  
To re-iterate: though it is widely used for school research, eligibility for FSM is not a 
consistent measure of ‘the poor’ or socially excluded. In fact, a better indicator, though it 
ultimately pertains to the area in which a pupil lives as opposed to the pupils 
themselves, is the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI). This is a fixed 
estimate of the proportion of children under the age of 16 within the (Lower Super 
Output) census area the pupil resides in that live in low-income households. From it is 
possible to calculate the proportion of pupils in each school that is admitted from the 
upper quartile of low income areas and then calculate the mean |LIC| scores to consider 
whether differential rates of admission from those areas of highest income deprivation 
are increasing or decreasing in time. 
The general trend is one of increase. The |LIC| scores based on IDACI as a measure 
of segregation are 0.218, 0.231, 0.245, 0.242, 0.227 and 0.245 for pupils admitted into 
London state-funded secondary schools in each of the years 2003 – 2008, respectively. 
However, the confidence intervals (not shown) are too great to attribute statistical 
significance to these changes. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has followed other researchers and used eligibility for free school meals 
(FSM) as the basis for measuring segregation between London’s state-funded secondary 
schools. However, it deviates from other studies in developing and applying explicitly 
local indices of segregation, informed by the assertion that segregation is a spatial 
outcome of spatial processes and needs therefore to be measured spatially. 
The substantive conclusion of the case study is that apparently competing 
secondary schools do not recruit equal proportions of FSM eligible pupils. The findings 
lend  support to those of Smithers & Robinson (2010)  who find that comprehensive 
schools in England are highly socially segregated. Across London, in 2008, the mean 
difference between a school and its average competitor was 0.078 (7.8 percentage points) against an overall proportion of 0.268 of pupils eligible for FSM. The patterns of 
segregation vary geographically and by school type, with schools that select either by 
faith or by academic ability tending to under recruit FSM eligible pupils relative to their 
competitors. Whilst there is no evidence that the social segregation has increased over 
the period 2002 to 2008, the evidence it may have decreased is rendered uncertain by 
the underlying inconsistency of what FSM eligibility measures at any time period. 
Indeed, a reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that FSM eligibility is not 
suitable for this sort of schools research at all (cf. Croxford 2008) and that a better 
measure, based on a fixed quantity (such as the IDACI score) is to be preferred. 
It is possible, of course, that greater numbers of pupils not eligible for FSM have 
migrated to schools outside London during the study period, or chosen fee-charging 
schools instead of the state sector. The data do not allow for analysis of these 
possibilities nor their effects on the analytical results. Furthermore, the analyses do not 
resolve the debate about whether the introduction of choice and competition within the 
education system is socially divisive. The problem is there is no counterfactual: the 
reforms have been introduced and any speculation about what would have otherwise 
happened is precisely that – speculation. As the author has noted elsewhere it is difficult 
to make a social justice argument in favour of insisting pupils must attend their local 
school even if it is underperforming. That just encourages ‘selection by mortgage’. Yet, if 
choice is to be promoted it should be a real choice with pupils having a reasonable 
guarantee of attending their preferred school. At the current time, though the 
overwhelming majority of pupils do attend their first choice school, that choice is 
constrained by the operation of admissions criteria. Of note is the use of geographical 
criteria that tend to give priority to those living closest to a school. The reason these 
exist is because schools are also encouraged to have community roles and functions. 
There is an awkward tension between this sort of localism agenda and not creating 
geographical barriers around who is admitted into any school; barriers that will 
propagate existing social divisions between school (Harris 2011b; Sutherland et al. 
2010; see also Andre-Bechely, 2007). 
In conclusion, Table 4 (below) summarises the attributes of the indices consider 
here. Each is defined by two characteristics. First, each incorporates a weights matrix 
quantifying the amount of interaction, dependency or connection between each zone or 
place in the study region. Second, each permits a separate – that is, localised – value to 
be calculated individually for each of those zones of places. None of the indices is 
definitive; each has its advantages and disadvantages, capturing different facets of what is understood by segregation. Nor is the list of indices exhaustive. Other indices can be 
developed to meet these criteria (a slightly different specification of the local index of 
difference is given by Harris 2011a). 
In closing, it should be stressed that the indices are not restricted to schools 
research alone. They can be used in any application where the prevalence of a given 
attribute can be calculated for a place or institution, where the locations of those places 
are known, and where a weights matrix can be used to formalise the relationship 
between places within the study region. Such applications include, for example, the 
study of differences in the ethnic composition of contiguous census areas. 
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one place or 
institution in the 
study region and 
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‘neighbour’ in 
respect to the 
proportion of 
their populations 
that are of a 
particular group 
or category. 
-1 to 1. A value less 
than zero means the 
one the one place has 
relatively fewer 
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0 to 1. Any value 
greater than zero 
means there is a 
difference between 
the one place and its 
average neighbour. 
Partially  Yes 
(Continued overleaf) 





averaging at a 
higher level of 
aggregation? 
1 
Local index of 
isolation (LII)  Equation 5 
Calculates the 
probability of 
selecting a person 
of a particular 
group or category 
from one place but 
not from the 
average neighbour.  
O to 1. Zero when no 
pupils in the place 
are of the group (so 
none could be 
isolated), one when 
all pupils are of the 
group but none in 
surrounding schools 
is. 
No   No 







one place and its 
average neighbour 
relative to the 
local prevalence 
of the group or 
attribute of 
interest. 
-1 to 1. The 
interpretation is the 
same as for the LID. 
Yes  No 








As above  0 to 1  Yes  Yes 
Table 4. Summarising the definitions and attributes of the local indices of segregation. 
 